





What determines banks’ market power? Akerlof versus Herfindahl
by
Moshe Kim, Eirik Gaard Kristiansen and Bent ValeISSN 0801-2504 (printed) 1502-8143 (online)
ISBN 82-7553-314-7 (printed), 82-7553-315-5 (online)
Working papers from Norges Bank can be ordered by e-mail:
posten@norges-bank.no
or from Norges Bank, Subscription service,
P.O.Box. 1179 Sentrum 
N-0107Oslo, Norway.
Tel. +47 22 31 63 83, Fax. +47 22 41 31 05
Working papers from 1999 onwards are available as pdf-files on the bank’s
web site: www.norges-bank.no, under “Publications”.
Norges Bank’s working papers present
research projects and reports
(not usually in their final form)
and are intended inter alia to enable
the author to benefit from the comments
of colleagues and other interested parties.
Views and conclusions expressed in working papers are 
the responsibility of the authors alone.
Working papers fra Norges Bank kan bestilles over e-post:
posten@norges-bank.no




Telefon 22 31 63 83, Telefaks 22 41 31 05
Fra 1999 og senere er publikasjonene tilgjengelige som pdf-filer 
på www.norges-bank.no, under “Publikasjoner”.
Working papers inneholder forskningsarbeider 
og utredninger som vanligvis
ikke har fått sin endelige form. 
Hensikten er blant annet at forfatteren 
kan motta kommentarer fra kolleger 
og andre interesserte.
Synspunkter og konklusjoner i arbeidene 






Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Bent Vale†
Norges Bank (The central bank of Norway)
September 12, 2005
JEL code: G21, L15
Keywords: Banking, risk-pricing, lock-in
∗We are grateful for comments from Andreas Benedictow, Allen N. Berger, Ari Hyytinen, Esa
Jokivuolle, Kjersti-Gro Lindquist, Charlotte Ostergaard, Richard J. Rosen, Erik Ø. Sørensen,
Kostas Tsatsaronis, Lucy White, and conference and seminar participants at the 41st Bank Struc-
ture Conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, CEPR International Conference on Com-
petition, Stability and Integration in European Banking in Brussels, SUERF Colloquium in Madrid,
Annual Meeting of Finnish Economists in Mariehamn, Norsk forskermøte for økonomer in Trond-
heim, European Central Bank, Bank of Finland, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, and Norges Bank. Views and conclusions are those of the authors and can not be
attributed to any of the persons or institutions mentioned above.
† Correpsonding author address: Norges Bank, C51, Box 1179, Sentrum, N-0107 Oslo Norway.
Fax: +47 22 42 40 62, e-mail: bent.vale@norges-bank.noAbstract
We introduce a model analyzing how asymmetric information problems
in a bank-loan market may evolve over the age of a borrowing ﬁrm. The
model predicts a life-cycle pattern for banks’ interest rate markup. Young
ﬁrms pay a low or negative markup, thereafter the markup increases until it
falls for old ﬁrms. Furthermore, the pattern of the life-cycle depends on the
informational advantage of the inside bank and when more dispersed borrower
information yields ﬁercer bank competition. By applying a new measure of
the informational advantage of inside banks and a large sample of small Nor-
wegian ﬁrms, we ﬁnd empirical support for the predicted markup pattern. We
disentangle eﬀects of asymmetric information (Akerlof eﬀect) from eﬀects of
a concentrated banking market (Herﬁndahl eﬀect). Our results indicate that
the interest rate markups are not inﬂuenced by bank market concentration.
21. Introduction
We analyze how competition and asymmetric information problems are interlinked in
credit markets. During the course of a lending relationship a bank obtains privileged
information about borrowers. The privileged information is a two-edged sword seen
from borrowers’ point of view. Privileged information reduces frictions in credit
markets, but creates lock-in eﬀects and market power for the inside bank, i.e., the
bank with which the ﬁrm has a relationship.
One of the contributions of this paper is in oﬀering a dynamic model of bank-
borrower relationship that evolves over three distinct periods in the life cycle of the
borrowing ﬁrm. Initially, before any bank has obtained privileged information about
young ﬁrms, they are oﬀered loans with a low or even negative interest rate markup.
By interest rate markup we mean the diﬀerence between the actual contractual
interest rate and the risk-adjusted interest rate, i.e., the one that gives the lender
zero expected proﬁts. As the ﬁrm’s inside bank gets access to privileged information
about the borrowing ﬁrm, it becomes informationally locked-in and the bank can
extract rents by increasing the interest rate markup. However, as the ﬁrm matures,
speciﬁc soft information about the ﬁrm gets more dispersed. Consequently the
market power of the inside bank decreases, as outside banks now ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
monitor the borrower and oﬀer loans. Hence, the markup is reduced. The existing
theoretical literature on relationship lending and informational lock-in only deals
with two distinct periods, the initial period when the borrower is subsidized and the
second period when he is locked-in.1 In contrast, our model can also explain how
informational lock-in is resolved.
The model predicts that this pattern of the interest rate markup over a ﬁrm’s life
c y c l ew i l lb em o r ep r o n o u n c e dt h em o r ei m p o r t a n ti st h es o f ti n f o r m a t i o nt h ei n s i d e
bank can obtain, i.e., the larger is the information asymmetry between the inside
bank and the outside banks. We test this and other predictions of our model using
panel data of small Norwegian non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms during the 2000-2001 period with a
total of 60,362 observations. We construct a novel measure proxying the importance
of the information asymmetry.
1See for instance Rajan (1992), Sharpe (1990) and, von Thadden (2004).
3This paper focuses on the importance of information asymmetries in determining
banks’ market power in credit markets characterized by relationship lending. It is
the degree of asymmetric information and the consequent lack of competition that
determines to what extent banks intertemporally share their surplus in long-term
bank relationships. This approach diﬀers from that of Petersen and Rajan (1995).
In their much cited paper, Petersen and Rajan also construct a model where lack
of competition in the credit markets allows banks to subsidize young de novo ﬁrms
and recapture this loss by charging older locked-in borrowers an interest rate above
the one yielding them zero expected proﬁts. However, in Petersen and Rajan (1995)
lack of competition in the credit market is represented by the degree of market
concentration (Herﬁndahl). Our study diﬀers from Petersen and Rajan in the sense
that we let the competitiveness of the credit market be determined by the availability
of soft information about the borrowers (Akerlof). In the empirical setup we are
able to test simultaneously whether intertemporal surplus sharing through long-term
bank relationships is determined by the degree of information asymmetry between
the inside bank and outside banks, or by the concentration in credit markets as in
Petersen and Rajan (1995). Our results indicate that the former is the determining
factor rather than the latter.2
In our theoretical model the number of banks that monitor a borrower and
thereby the strength and time-span of the lock-in eﬀect are endogenized. This
model is closely related to other models also explaining how ﬁrms can mitigate hold-
up problems or lock-in eﬀects by establishing several bank relationships.3 However,
these models focus on situations where ﬁrms decide, in the ﬁrst period, on the
number of bank relationships. In contrast, our setup makes multiple monitoring
of young ﬁrms unproﬁtable. We argue that ﬁxed monitoring costs cannot initially
2There are other empirical papers that also check the robustness of some of the ﬁndings by
Petersen and Rajan, although with a diﬀerent approach from ours. All in all these studies seem to
give mixed results. Black and Strahan (2002) ﬁnd that less concentrated banking markets lead to
more incorporations of new ﬁrms, thus casting doubts on Petersen and Rajan’s ﬁndings. Similarly
Cetorelli (2004) ﬁnds that a more concentrated banking industry leads to larger size of the non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), however, report results indicating that younger
ﬁrms relying on external ﬁnance grow faster the more concentrated is the banking sector. A brief
overview of this literature can be found in Berger, Hasan, and Klapper (2003).
3Ongena and Smith (2000) show in an empirical study, that multiple relationships reduce the
hold-up problem, but can worsen the availability of credit. See also Detragiache, Garella, and
Guiso (2000).
4be covered by more than one bank. Other researchers have argued that multiple
monitoring is infeasible due to free-riding problems (Thakor (1996)).4 We show that
as ﬁrms mature, more banks (or other monitors) ﬁnd it proﬁtable to monitor them
and thereby alleviate ﬁrms’ hold-up or lock-in problem. Existing literature allows
ﬁrms to determine the number of banks from which they borrow. In contrast, we let
improvements in the pool of loan applicants as the ﬁr m sm a t u r ea n dt h ea c c o r d i n g l y
increased bank competition determine when lock-in problems are resolved.
There is a growing literature arguing that competition intensity also inﬂuences
banks investments in borrower-bank relationships. Boot and Thakor (2000), Elsas
(2005), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004), and Degryse and Ongena (2004) all show
that competition may have an important impact on banks’ investments in industry
expertise and relationship development. If ﬁercer competition induces banks on av-
erage to provide more valuable services to their borrowers, we might expect to see
that equilibrium interest rates are higher in more competitive markets. Boot and
Thakor (2000) show in their theoretical model how ﬁerce bank competition may
induce banks to substitute transactional lending with relationship lending thereby
insulating a larger share of their loan portfolio from competition induced by rivalling
banks. The average borrower may, due to this substitution eﬀect, increase his will-
ingness to pay high interest rates. In the empirical part of the present study, we
are also able to examine whether competition, measured as market concentration,
increases borrowers’ willingness to pay high interest rates.
The paper is organized as follow: In Section 2 we present a theoretical model
showing how the severity of asymmetric information aﬀects borrower lock-in and
hence competition between banks and interest rate markups. The empirical model
testing both the predictions regarding markups and asymmetric information ema-
nating from our theoretical model, as well as the aforementioned potential relation-
ships between markups and market concentration, is presented along with the data
in Section 3. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section
5c o n c l u d e s .
4Carletti (2004) endogenizes banks’ monitoring intensities and shows how ﬁrms by choosing to
borrow from more than one bank can induce a preferred monitoring intensity. In contrast to our
model, Carletti does not introduce a dynamic model that allows the number of monitoring banks
to change as the ﬁrms mature.
52. Theory
In this section we introduce a theoretical model of bank competition that shows how
the lifecycle of the interest rate markup depends on two types of asymmetric informa-
tion problems. Firstly, there is an asymmetric information problem between banks
and borrowers and, secondly, there is a potential asymmetric information problem
between inside and outside banks when they "bid". The model endogenizes the
number of monitoring banks in order to show how ﬁrm speciﬁc information gets
dispersed and lock-in eﬀects weaken. The theoretical model allows us to derive pre-
dictions about how the two types of asymmetric information problems inﬂuence the
length of the lock-in period and the timing and size of the minimum and maximum
interest rate markup charged by banks.
In what follows we outline the model in detail.
2.1. The borrowing ﬁrm
A ﬁrm is modelled as a sequence of projects all requiring investment of 1. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the ﬁrm does not have own funds and needs to borrow 1 from
ab a n ki ne a c hp e r i o dt, t ≥ 0 (see Rajan (1992) for why asymmetric information
problems may imply that only short-term loan contracts are used in equilibrium).
In our adverse-selection model, a project in each period is either good or bad
independently of the quality of the previous project. The good project succeeds
with probability θ + β while the bad project succeeds with probability θ − β.A
successful project is worth R while a failure is worth 0. Apart from Proposition
4 which concerns credit availability, we assume that both good and bad projects
have positive NPV, i.e., (θ − β)R>1. The probability of having a good project
in period t is common knowledge and denoted s(t). We assume that the average
quality of borrowers is improving as the ﬁrms mature ("survival of the ﬁttest"), i.e.,
s0(t) > 0. Consequently, we assume that experienced ﬁrms are more likely to have
good projects than young and unexperienced ﬁrms.
62.2. Banks
There are two banks that consider monitoring the ﬁrm.5 Let F>0 denote per-
period monitoring cost. Although, monitoring cost incurs in each period, we assume
that monitoring decisions are long-term commitments; a monitoring bank will con-
tinue to do monitoring although a rivaling bank starts monitoring. Furthermore,
it is assumed that F is suﬃciently large compared with expected proﬁtt om a k ei t
unproﬁtable for both banks to start monitoring in period 0. The inside bank moni-
tors the ﬁrm and with probability λ it is revealed to the bank whether the project is
good or bad. The outside and inside banks both have access to the same information
about the project with probability (1 − λ). Notice, however, that the outside bank
does not know whether the inside bank has obtained privileged information or not.
An outside bank knows only the probability of the ﬁrm being of a good type, i.e.
s(t).
The competition between the two banks is considered as an ”English auction”
where banks decrease their interest rates until one bank is active and this bank
captures the borrower. If the two banks’ lowest interest rates are identical and they
both monitor the borrower, they capture the borrower with equal probability. If
only one bank does monitoring, the borrower will weakly favour the existing lender.
This assumption ensures that, in equilibrium, there will not be change of lenders
as long as only one bank does monitoring, but the rivaling outside bank limits the
interest-rate markup the inside bank can obtain.6
For simplicity, we assume that ﬁrms and banks are risk neutral and that the
risk-free interest rate is 0.
In our set up banks know that the average quality of borrowers is improving
as the borrowers age and this makes it increasingly attractive for banks to bear
the ﬁxed monitoring costs and make credit assessment in order to make loan oﬀers.
When a second bank starts making credit assessments, information about borrowers
5We endogenize when the second bank starts monitoring. A straight forward generalization of
our model would be to endogenize when n>2 banks start monitoring.
6In an English auction an auctioneer starts with a high interest rate and gradually decreases
it. The current interest rate, r, is observed by all banks (bidders) and the banks choose whether
to be in the competition or to exit. Banks may drop out at any time, and if they do they are not
allowed to reenter the competition (auction) for the borrower. When the auction ends there is only
one active bank. See Krishna (2002) for a discussion of diﬀerent rules in English auctions.
7success probabilities becomes more dispersed and bank competition increases. In
the next section we examine the market equilibrium in detail.
2.3. Equilibrium
We will show that there exists a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
where one bank lends to and monitors a ﬁrm from date 0 and the second bank starts
monitoring at date T>0.L e tπ denote the proﬁt obtained by the ﬁrst bank until
the second bank start monitoring (π will be analyzed subsequently).
In equilibrium the banks set their interest rates, re, as described by Proposition
1.
Proposition 1.
i) At t =0both banks oﬀer interest rates that will remove all long term proﬁt
r






− π − 1.
ii) At t ∈ [1,T− 1] the outside bank expects to capture only bad projects and
oﬀers interest rates, re,r e ﬂecting the risk of bad projects
r




and the inside bank will keep the borrower by oﬀering the same interest rate as the
outside bank.
iii) At t ∈ [T,∞i both banks may acquire privileged information. Interest rate
charged a borrower having a good project depends on whether more than one bank











with probability 1 − λ
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while the interest rate charged a borrower with a bad project reﬂects its credit risk
r
e




Proof. Part i): Straightforward.
Part ii): Note that the bidding behaviour of the informed inside bank is such
that its lowest bid implies zero proﬁt. The outside bank will correctly expect that
8it only will capture borrowers with bad projects if it improves its interest rate bid
from r = 1
θ−β − 1 and this will make a better interest bid nonproﬁtable.
Part iii): The same argument as for Part ii) can be applied for Part iii).
Proposition 1 describes bank competition taking the second bank’s monitoring
decision as given (T is taken as given). We will now analyze T and study when

















if it monitors. In the above expression, λ(1 − λ) denotes the probability of obtaining
exclusive privileged information, s(t) is the probability that the project is good and
succeeds with probability (θ+β). In case of success, the ﬁrm is able to pay the face





if the other bank fears that the borrower has a bad
project.7
The second bank ﬁnds it proﬁtable to start monitoring when the per-period proﬁt
exceeds the monitoring costs. More formally, the following condition (2.1) describes












Condition (2.1) states that it is non-proﬁtable to start monitoring in period T − 1
but proﬁtable in period T.S i n c es0(t) > 0 it follows that T is uniquely deﬁned by
condition (2.1).
We can now calculate the proﬁt from capturing the borrower in period 0 instead







7T h ei n s i d eb a n ko ﬀers a loan contract that makes the entrepreneur indiﬀerent between accept-
ing the contract from the inside bank and accepting the contract from the outside bank. Since the










9In a competitive bank-loan market (Bertrand competition) where banks expect to
proﬁt from long-term bank-borrower relationships, banks price their initial loans at
date 0 very aggressively in order to attract new borrowers. Competition at date 0
drives the interest rate down until the winning bank spends the entire anticipated
proﬁts (π) to subsidize the initial loan.
We can now compare the equilibrium interest rate with the interest rate yield-
ing zero-bank proﬁt provided that the bank has only access to public information.









Note that r∗(t) is decreasing as the quality of the average borrower improves, i.e.
s(t) increases. The markup on the benchmark interest rate in period t is mt =
re(t) −r∗(t). From the deﬁnition of r∗(t) and Proposition 1 it follows directly that:
Proposition 2. The markup, mt, follows a life cycle pattern;
i) in period t =0 , we have mt < 0
ii) in the following periods, t ∈ [1,T− 1] , mt is increasing in t.
iii) in period T, we have mT <m T−1.
Note that the equilibrium interest rate at T −1 is 1









θ+β − 1 where λ
2s(t) is the probability that both banks
have discovered that the project is good.
In Proposition 3 we show that the life cycle of the markup may depend on the
size of the monitoring costs which we associate with the prevalence of asymmetric
information problems in the credit market. Firms with more asymmetric information
problems and, consequently, higher monitoring costs may have a diﬀerent markup
cycle than ﬁrms with lower monitoring costs.
Proposition 3. Firms with high monitoring costs (F),
i) have a longer lock-in period (T)t h a nﬁrms with low monitoring costs.
ii) have a higher maximum markup (mT)t h a nﬁrms with low monitoring costs.
10Proof. Part i) follows directly from (2.1) and the assumption that s0 (t) > 0.



















(θ + β)(θ − β)
s(t − 1)
and that s0 (t) > 0. Part ii) follows from observing that mt reaches its maximum
at t = T − 1 and that T is increasing in F (follows from part i).
Not only markups but also credit availability may depend on asymmetric infor-
mation problems in credit markets. In order to focus on potential eﬀects on credit
availability we will allow ﬁrms to have negative NPV projects in the ﬁrst period.
Consequently, some ﬁrms will be unable to obtain funding in period 0 unless banks
expect to gain from long-run bank-borrower relationships. We divert from the set
up above by making one new assumption; in the ﬁrst period the success probability
is between 0 and 1, or more formally in period 0 we let θ = θ0 ∈ [β,1 − β].Ab a n k
is willing to lend to all borrowers in period 0 with θ0 > ˆ θ where ˆ θ is deﬁned by
1=s(0)
³
ˆ θ + β
´
R +( 1− s(0))
³




Expected pay back on the ﬁrst loan
+ Π |{z}
Long run gain
where Π is total proﬁt banks expect to earn on a borrower (may contain proﬁta f t e r
the lock-in period ends). A bank is willing to lend the borrower 1 dollar — although
the expected pay back on the initial loan is low — as long as the long run-gain from
establishing a bank-borrower relationship is suﬃciently large. By observing that a
longer lock-in period increases Π, we have Proposition 4:
Proposition 4. A bank accepts borrowers with lower ﬁrst-period success probabil-
ities (lower ˆ θ) if the proﬁts from lock-in, Π, increases.
In the empirical section to follow, we show how the asymmetric information
problems and lock-in eﬀects evolve for a large sample of Norwegian ﬁrms.
113. Empirical investigation
3.1. Hypotheses and modelling
In this section we specify an empirical model in order to test the empirical implica-
tions or hypotheses derived from the theoretical model in section 2:
I The interest rate markup follows a life cycle pattern over the ﬁrm’s age: young
ﬁrms pay a low or negative markup, thereafter the markup increases until it
falls for old ﬁrms (see Proposition 2).
II The life cycle pattern described in I is more pronounced for more opaque ﬁrms,
i.e., ﬁrms with more severe asymmetric information problems (see Proposition
3i i ) .
III Banks will on average lend to ﬁrms with higher bankruptcy probability if the
lock-in eﬀect is stronger (see Proposition 4).
IV More opaque ﬁrms have a longer lock-in period (see Proposition 3 i).
Unlike the existing literature, our empirical model allows us to distinguish eﬀects
originating from asymmetric information from those originating from market con-
centration. In their much cited paper, Petersen and Rajan (1995) examine pricing
and credit availability associated with the degree of competition in credit markets,
measured as market concentration. They introduce a theoretical model which they
use to show how credit availability and intertemporal pricing of loans may depend
on market concentration. Consistent with their theoretical model they ﬁnd that
concentrated credit markets allow banks to take a loss initially in order to bene-
ﬁt from a long-term relationship with a borrower. In Petersen and Rajan (1995)
market concentration determines to what extent ﬁrms can establish long-term re-
lationships. In contrast, we examine directly whether asymmetrically dispersed
information between inside and outside banks is crucial for establishing long-term
bank relationships. It is the informational advantage of the inside bank that reduces
competition and allows the bank to intertemporally share its surplus in a long-term
bank relationship. In order to make our study comparable with Petersen and Rajan
12(1995) we introduce market concentration variables in addition to asymmetric in-
formation variables. In this way we can examine whether market concentration has
a separate eﬀect on the intertemporal pricing of loans (see Hypothesis V below).
Petersen and Rajan (1995) assume that bank loans are homogenous. In con-
trast, Boot and Thakor (2000) suggest that banks may change their type of lending
when the competitive environment changes. They present a theoretical model where
banks strategically choose how much of their lending they want to do as transaction
based lending compared with relationship lending. Relationship lending increases
the success probability of borrowers projects and therefore makes borrowers will-
ing to pay higher interest rates. If reduced market concentration induces banks
to provide more valuable relationship loans, interest rate markups may increase as
markets get less concentrated8. This suggests Hypothesis VI below. To summarize,
by including a market concentration measure in our empirical model we are able to
also test the following two opposing hypotheses:
V Reduced market concentration leads to lower interest rate markups for mature
ﬁrms and higher markups for de novo ﬁrms. This eﬀe c to fm a r k e tc o n c e n t r a -
tion on interest rate markup will lend support to the ﬁndings by Petersen and
Rajan (1995).
VI Reduced market concentration leads to higher interest rate markup for an aver-
age borrower. Assuming higher interest rate markups in relationship banking
compared with transaction based banking, this ﬁnding may lend support to
Boot and Thakor (2000).
To test the above hypotheses I to VI, we present an econometric model with the
actual interest rate markup (i.e., the actual interest rate minus the risk adjusted
zero expected proﬁts interest rate) paid by ﬁr m sa st h eL H Sv a r i a b l e . F o rR H S
v a r i a b l e sw eu s et h ea g eo ft h eﬁrm (represented by two dummies for three diﬀerent
age groups: young, middle aged, and mature ﬁrms), a variable representing the
degree of asymmetric information, and a variable measuring market concentration
in the diﬀerent credit markets covered by the data.
8We are not able to ex ante separate transaction based borrowers from relationship borrowers
in our sample. However, such a separation is not necessary when one can assume that there are
higher interest rate markups in relationship banking compared with transaction based lending.
13We specify the risk-adjusted zero-expected proﬁts interest rate as the interest
rate a borrowing ﬁrm would pay in a world with a risk neutral competitive banking
industry in the following way:








where rf,t is the risk-free money market interest rate, pi,t is the probability at time t
that ﬁrm i will go bankrupt, LGB i st h el o s sg i v e nb a n k r u p t c y ,i . e . ,t h ef r a c t i o no f
the principal of the loan that the bank will have to write oﬀ in case of bankruptcy.9
r∗
i,t is then deﬁned as the risk-adjusted interest rate.
Our LHS variable, the interest rate markup is thus
mi,t = ri,t − r∗
i,t , (3.1)
where ri,t is the actual interest rate ﬁrm i pays in year t. r∗
i,t is the average of the
risk-adjusted interest rate for year t based on the bankruptcy probability pi,t−1 and
the risk-adjusted interest rate for year t based on the bankruptcy probability pi,t.
In both cases the risk-free interest rate for year t, rf,t is used. Our motivation for
using this average is the fact that during year t only the information from balance
sheet and income statements for year t − 1 are publicly available. However, a bank
lending to a ﬁrm in year t will also seek current information from the ﬁrm’s books
to further help assessing the bankruptcy probability of the ﬁrm.
The general form of our empirical model is
mi,t =( AINFO,dAGE;i,t,concentration,  i,t) , (3.2)
AINFO is a variable representing the severity of asymmetric information. dAGE;i,t
is a vector of the dummies representing the age group for ﬁrm i in year t. It will
9In the actual empirical model LGB is set at 0.6. The Basel Committee suggests in its Third
Consultative Paper, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), that loss given default (LGD)
is set to 45% for senior unsecured debt and 75 % for subordinated claims without speciﬁc collateral
(the IRB Foundation approach). Note however that we look at bankruptcy which is more ‘severe’
than default.
14enable us to test how the interest rate markup diﬀers between ﬁrms of various ages.
concentration c a p t u r e st h ed e g r e eo fc o n c e n t r a t i o ni nt h ec r e d i tm a r k e tf r o mw h i c h
the ﬁrm demands credit.  i,t is the stochastic residual.
3.2. Data
Our data are collected from the SEBRA-database covering all limited liability ﬁrms
in Norway.10 This database contains annual ﬁnancial statements (balance sheets
and income statements) from 1988 to 2001. It also contains information about
ﬁrms’ characteristics such as the industrial sector code, the geographical location of
the ﬁrms’ head oﬃces, and ﬁrms’ age. In addition, we apply results from a model
predicting bankruptcy probability for each ﬁrm and each year (see Appendix B).
In this model, bankruptcy is deﬁned as the event in which a ﬁrm declares itself
bankrupt within the next three years. The predicted bankruptcy probabilities from
the model are added to the database.11 In our empirical model we use these predicted
bankruptcy probabilities.
From year 2000 the SEBRA-database allows us to separate bank loans from
other debt. Hence, we use data from year 2000 and 2001. The database contains
information for approximately 130,000 ﬁrms each year, and initially we are left with
a quarter of a million observations. Of those, however, we only consider non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms. Since we are particularly interested in the asymmetric information aspect in
relationship lending we have removed ﬁrms that have issued bonds and thus often
have a bond rating. Furthermore we drop ﬁrms that either lend to or borrow from
other companies in a conglomerate. Lending inside a conglomerate is not associated
with signiﬁcant asymmetric information problems. We also exclude large ﬁrms,
those with an annual operating income above 100 NOK million, leaving us with a
sample of rather small ﬁrms, ﬁrms about which there is little public information.
Actual paid interest rates are calculated from ﬁrms’ income statements and bal-
ance sheets by dividing each ﬁrm’s interest cost by the unweighted average of bank
loans outstanding at the end of year t − 1 and t.12 Since most loans extended by
10The SEBRA-database is owned by Norges Bank (The central bank of Norway), and is based
on data supplied and quality tested by Dun and Bradstreet.
11This model is described in Eklund, Larsen, and Bernhardsen (2001), and a more comprehensive
description is given in Bernhardsen (2001).
12Some ﬁrms have large changes in their lending during the beginning or the end of the year. This
15Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Operating income 5921 10409.4 -4607 99661
Total assets 5529 14992.23 0 665162
Bank debt to total assets .75 11.56 0 1771
Interest rate 0.117 0.0426 0.06 0.2499
Interest rate markup 0.0265 0.0563 −1.242 0.1795
Probability of bankruptcy .02431 .05143 .00006 .68401
Firm age 11.2 13.1 0 149
Number of observations is 60,362. Operating income and total assets are mea-
sured in NOK thousands. Bank debt to total assets is measured as a ratio.
Interest rate and interest rate markup are also measured as ratios. Probability
of bankruptcy, measured as a ratio, is predicted from the SEBRA model. Firm
age is measured in years.
Norwegian banks have a ﬂoating interest rate, we believe our approach of calcu-
lating interest rate is more accurate than interest rates that can be collected from
loan contracts annually. In 2000 and 2001 the central bank changed its deposit rate
ﬁve times and one time, respectively. Contractual interest rates observed once a
year would not capture these changes in interest rates. By calculating the interest
r a t e su s i n gt h ei n t e r e s tc o s tf o rt h ew h o l ey e a r ,w ei m p l i c i t l yi n c l u d et h ei n t r a - y e a r
changes of interest rates.
Our panel then consists of 35,423 ﬁrms in 2000 and 24,939 ﬁrms in 2001. Of
these 24,939 ﬁrms 24,520 are observed in both years. Table 3.1 gives a summary of
some of the interesting characteristics of the ﬁrms in the sample.
Table 3.1 illustrates that there is a considerable ﬁrm heterogeneity in the sample.
3,094 of the ﬁr m sh a v ez e r ob a n kd e b tb yt h ee n do fo n eo ft h ey e a r s .O ft h e6 0 , 3 6 2
observations 6.4 pct. of the ﬁrms have bank debt to total assets larger than unity.
i.e., they are technically, but not necessarily legally bankrupt. This variation in
leads to unrealistically low or high calculated interest rates for those ﬁrms. Such phenomena occur
more frequently for larger ﬁrms. That is one further motive for excluding from the sample large
ﬁrms, deﬁned as ﬁrms with annual sales in excess of NOK 100 million corresponding to appr. EUR
12.5 million. This leaves out 5203 observations or 8.6 pct. of the ﬁnal number of observations.
We also exclude remaining observations with pathological interest rates. In an empirical work
also based on the SEBRA-database Bernhardsen and Larsen (2003) use the same procedure for
calculating ﬁrm borrowing interest rate. In their paper they ﬁnd strong evidence that this a
reasonably accurate measure of the interest rate borrowing ﬁrms face.
16the probability of bankruptcy to some extent also spills over to the interest rate
markup. There are a few ﬁrms in the sample with large negative markups. These
are ﬁrms with high bankruptcy probabilities for which the risk-adjusted interest rates
are correspondingly high. Large negative markups can be due to banks aggressive
pricing of loans to new borrowers as suggested by our theory model.13
There is also considerable variation in the age of ﬁrms. The average ﬁrm in the
sample is just below 12 years, and the oldest ﬁrm is 149 years. The age distribution
in the sample is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 shows that the peak age of ﬁrms in our sample is 3 years. The
median age is 7 years and the mean just above 11 years. This skewed distribution
is typical for the age of ﬁrms in large samples. Many of the relatively young ﬁrms
will not survive as independent entities because they go bankrupt, are closed before
bankruptcy, or are acquired by other ﬁrms. Nevertheless 7,646 or 12.7 pct. of the
observations in the sample relate to ﬁrms 20 years or older.
We suggest a novel measure of the severity of asymmetric information problems
between inside and outside banks. In line with our theoretical model, we assume
that an inside bank obtains information about ﬁrms credit worthiness before outside
banks. This information advantage of inside banks is particularly valuable in indus-
tries where ﬁrms’ credit worthiness change quickly. Hence we propose the volatility
of bankruptcy probability in the industry to which the ﬁrm belongs, as a measure of
the inside banks’ information advantage over outside banks. Figure 3.2 illustrates
the change in bankruptcy probability for three diﬀerent ﬁrms in our sample.14 Con-
sider a ﬁrm belonging to an industry where ﬁrms’ bankruptcy probabilities and
credit ratings vary considerably over time. Soft information about ﬁrms’ prospects
acquired through a bank relationship is particularly valuable in such industries. This
13Alternatively, a large negative markup can be due to ﬁrms’ moral hazard problems which
prevent banks from increasing the interest rate (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Williamson
(1987)).
14For the high volatility ﬁrm in Figure 3.2 the volatility of bankruptcy probability is just below
the 95 pct. fractile. For the low volatility low bankruptcy probability ﬁrm both the bankruptcy
probability and its volatility are below the 5 pct. fractile. The low volatility high bankruptcy
probability ﬁrm has for three consecutive years a bankruptcy probability around the 85 pct. fractile,
its bankruptcy probability falls and after a few years remains below the lower quartile. Its volatility,
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Figure 3.2: Volatility of bankruptcy probabilities.
informational advantage of the inside bank may expose the ﬁrms in this industry to
considerable informational lock-in eﬀects.15
3.3. The empirical model
Our theoretical model predicts that the interest rate markup is lower for younger
ﬁrms, than for middle aged ﬁrms. For older, or more mature ﬁrms, it will again be
lower. Furthermore, the model predicts that ﬁrms facing severe asymmetric infor-
mation problems (more costly monitoring) experience a more pronounced markup
cycle. In order to test these hypotheses we assign ﬁrms into three diﬀerent age
groups; young ﬁrms, middle aged ﬁrms, and old ﬁrms. Age groups are represented
by dummies. Furthermore we allow the age dummies to interact with our measure-
ment of the severity of asymmetric information.
15An alternative measure of the inside bank’s information advantage, could be the errors in
the predictions of the bankruptcy probability m o d e lS E B R A .H o w e v e r ,u s eo fs u c ham e a s u r e
would implicitly assume that the inside bank has perfect information about the true bankruptcy
probability of a borrower from the start of the lending relationship. We believe this is a too strong
assumption, therefore we choose not to use this measure
19As alluded to earlier, we want our empirical model to also enable a test of the two
alternative predictions set out by Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Boot and Thakor
(2000). In the paper by Petersen and Rajan the potential lock-in phenomenon of
borrowers in relationship banking may stem from the exogenous competitiveness of
the credit market, represented by a market concentration variable. In Boot and
Thakor market concentration leads to more transactional lending and lower average
interest rates.16 Therefore we include a measure of credit market concentration
and allow it to interact with ﬁr ma g ed u m m i e si nt h es a m ew a ya so u rm e a s u r e
of asymmetric information. Consequently, our empirical model can be used to test
whether asymmetric information, credit market concentration, or both determine
how the interest rate markup evolves over a ﬁrm’s age.
We apply the following empirical model:
mi,t = β0 + β1dYO UNG ;i,t + β2dOLD;i,t + β3VLc,k + β4VLc,k · dYO UNG ;i,t (3.3)
+β5VLc,k · dOLD;i,t + β6HIc,t + β7HIc,t · dYO UNG ;i,t + β8HIc,t · dOLD;i,t +  i,t ,
where:
dYO UNG ;i,t is a dummy taking value 1 if the ﬁrm is 10 years old or younger, 0
otherwise.17
dOLD;i,t is a dummy taking value 1 if the ﬁrm is older than 20 years, 0 otherwise.
∆pi,t is the change in bankruptcy probability of ﬁrm i from year t − 1 to year t.
σ(∆pi) is the standard deviation over time of ∆pi,t, i.e., a measure of the volatility in
the bankruptcy probability of ﬁrm i. As discussed above, we use this volatility
measure as a proxy for the asymmetric information problems related to lend-
ing to ﬁrm i. Higher volatility implies more severe asymmetric information
problems.
VLc,k is the mean of σ(∆pi) for all ﬁrms in industry sector k in county c. Essentially
it captures the volatility of the bankruptcy probability of ﬁrms in the speciﬁc
16Note that Boot and Thakor (2000) introduce a static model which does not have implication
for the dynamic structure of interest rate markups.
17Cf. (Petersen and Rajan, 1995, p. 420) who also classify ﬁrms 10 years and younger as young
ﬁrms.
20industry and county. We regard it as a proxy for the severity of the ex ante
asymmetric information problem in lending to a ﬁrm within this particular
group of ﬁrms.18
HIc,t is the Herﬁndahl index for county c in year t, measuring the market concen-
tration of bank loans to all domestic non-ﬁnancial business borrowers. Data
f o rt h i sv a r i a b l ei sc o l l e c t e df r o mt h eN o r w e g i a nb a n k ss t a t i s t i c sp r o d u c e db y
Norges Bank (ORBOF).19
4. Results and discussion
The model (3.3) is estimated using OLS and White robust standard errors.20 Results
are presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 shows that, ceteris paribus, young ﬁrms are charged a signiﬁcantly lower
interest rate markup than the group of middle aged ﬁrms (our reference group)21.
So is also the case with the older ﬁrms, i.e., those older than 20 years of age. Thus,
we ﬁn ds u p p o r tf o rt h el i f ec y c l ep a t t e r no fi n t e r e s tr a t em a r k u p so v e rﬁrms’ age,
as predicted by our theoretical model (Hypothesis I): All else equals, young ﬁrms
are charged a lower interest rate markup compared to middle aged ﬁrms. As ﬁrms
m a t u r ea n dg e to l d( o l d e rt h a n2 0y e a r s )t hey are again charged a lower interest
18To calculate VL c,k we use observations spanning the whole period of the SEBRA-database,
1988 to 2001.
19In calculating the Herﬁndahl index we also include lending from mortgage companies to non-
ﬁnancial business borrowers. If a mortgage company is owned by a bank its loans are considered
as part of the banks’ loans. However, we do not include lending from ﬁnance companies, that
mainly do factoring and leasing. Debts to these companies normally will not be included in the
debt numbers we use to calculate the interest rates paid by borrowing ﬁrms.
20We note that the Herﬁndahl index HIc,t has constant values over all observations pertaining
to one particular county in one particular year, that is, it is clustered. Clustering of RHS-variables
tend to bias the estimated parameter standard errors downwards, (Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mul-
lainathan (2004)). To alleviate this potential problem we estimate the model using White robust
standard errors also robust to clustering, by adjusting the variance-covariance matrix for those
clusters using the cluster command in STATA.
21We deﬁne young ﬁrms as those 10 years old or younger. We also run the model with young
ﬁrms being 5 years old or younger. However, the results obtained with that deﬁnition indicate that
ﬁrms in the age group 5 to 10 years old still are subsidized by their bank.
21Table 4.1: Results, dependent variable mi,t
Independent variable Coeﬃcient Robust t-values
β0 0.04163 9.88∗∗
dYO UNG ;i,t −0.00708 −2.38∗∗
dOLD;i,t −0.01425 −3.62∗∗
VLc,k 0.06322 2.83∗∗
VLc,k · dYO UNG ;i,t −0.5314 −15.65∗∗
VLc,k · dOLD;i,t 0.2253 5.34∗∗
HIc,t −3.27 · 10−6 −1.57
HIc,t · dYO UNG ;i,t 2.98 · 10−6 1.81∗
HIc,t · dOLD;i,t 3.26 · 10−6 1.51
F-test for HIc,t terms 1.24
#c l u s t e r s 36
#o b s e r v a t i o n s 60362
R2adj. 0.0422
The t-values reported are White-robust and adjusted for cluster-
ing of HIc,t. ∗ r e p r e s e n t sa1 0p c t .s t a t i s t i c a ls i g n i ﬁcance and ∗∗
5p c t .s i g n i ﬁcance
rate markup.22
T h en e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant value of the coeﬃcient for VLc,k·dYO UNG ;i,t indicates
that for young ﬁrms the interest rate markup is decreasing in the informational
advantage of the inside bank. The positive and signiﬁcant values of the coeﬃcients
for VLc,k and for VLc,k · dOLD;i,t show that middle aged and old ﬁrms, respectively,
both face higher interest rate markups the more severe the problems of asymmetric
information for those ﬁrms are. These results support t h eh y p o t h e s i st h a tt h el i f e
cycle pattern of the interest rate markup is more pronounced for more opaque ﬁrms,
i.e., ﬁrms which face stronger informational lock-in eﬀects (Hypothesis II). Figure
4.1 illustrates how the markup for a typical ﬁrm changes as it moves through the
three diﬀerent age classes, young, middle aged, and old, keeping VL c,k and HIc,t
constant. The vertical arrows indicate how the respective interest rate markups
would shift as the opaqueness of the ﬁrm, VL c,k,i n c r e a s e s .
22The way we have deﬁned markup in this model it is not pure rent. It will also cover banks’
operating costs. In addition there may be rent stemming from other deviations from perfect
competition than those studied in this model. See for instance Kim, Kristiansen, and Vale (2005).
These elements have been left out of our theoretical model. Hence the fact that our empirical
model in (3.3) will yield positive interest rate markup even for young ﬁrms with very high severity
of asymmetric information problem, can be consistent with the prediction of our theory model.
22Interest rate 
markup 
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Figure 4.1: Interest rate markup for the three diﬀerent age groups. The qualitative
eﬀects from increased volatility (VL c,k) is illustrated by the vertical arrows.
The coeﬃcient for HIc,t is negative but not statistically signiﬁcant. Neither is
the coeﬃcient of HIc,t · dOLD;i,t.T h ec o e ﬃcient of HIc,t · dYOUNG ;i,t is positive and
signiﬁcant at the 10 pct. level. Jointly the terms containing HIc,t are not signiﬁcant,
as demonstrated by the F-test. These results lead to a rejection of Hypothesis V
that lower market concentration should lead to lower interest rate markup for old
ﬁrms and higher markups for younger ﬁrms. I.e., we do not ﬁnd support for the
link between market concentration and interest rate markup charged to young ﬁrms
as found in Petersen and Rajan (1995). Neither do the results give support to the
competing Hypothesis VI: lower market concentration leads to higher interest rate
markup.
Our results demonstrate that the informational advantage of the inside bank
(measured as the volatility of ﬁrms’ bankruptcy probability), and not market con-
centration, creates lock-in eﬀects. Thus, to what extent banks subsidize very young
ﬁrms in order to capture lock-in rents when ﬁrms are older, is determined by the
informational advantage of the inside bank. A traditional measure of market com-
petition, like the Herﬁndahl index, cannot explain the life-cycle of the interest rate
23m a r k u p .W ea l s or u nt h em o d e l( 3 . 3 )r e p l a c i n gt h eH e r ﬁndahl index with the com-
bined market share of the three largest banks in each market. The results were
qualitatively the same as those reported in table 4.1.
The above empirical model (3.3) can not be used to test hypothesis III: banks
will on average lend to riskier young ﬁrms if informational lock-in eﬀects become
stronger. To test this hypothesis we suggest the following procedure: First, we
calculate the average bankruptcy probability for all observations of ﬁrms 10 years
and younger within each industry sector k in each county c, pYO UNG ;c,k.F o rt h es a m e
groups of observations we calculate the average interest rate markup, mYO UNG ;c,k.
We use these data to run the following simple regression
pYO UNG ;c,k = α0 + α1mYO UNG ;c,k +  c,k (4.1)
Hypothesis III suggests a negative sign of α1, i.e., a more pronounced lock-in eﬀect,
measured as lower markup for young ﬁrms, implies that the average credit worthi-
ness for young ﬁrms decreases. The estimated α1 coeﬃcient is −0.6856,a n dt h e
White robust t-value is −34.70.23 This result indicates that increased lock-in due to
asymmetric information improves the credit availability for young high-risk ﬁrms.
Thus, hypothesis III is conﬁrmed.
Our next step is to test Hypothesis IV: more opaque ﬁrms face longer lock-in
periods. First, we calculate the predicted markup, b m, for the three diﬀerent age
groups (cf. Figure 4.1), keeping HIc,t at its median value, and varying VL c,k.I f
ﬁrms with high VL c,k face an interest rate markup that is increasing over ﬁrm age,
while ﬁrms with a median or low VL c,k face a signiﬁcant drop in their interest rate
markup as they become old, we consider this as supporting Hypothesis IV: ﬁrms
with severe asymmetric information problems face longer lock-in periods. In Table
4.2 we report the predicted markup, b m, and its standard errors for the three diﬀerent
age groups for VL c,k at its median value and at its 95 pct. fractile value.
23The number of observations is 4950 and the R-squared is 0.488.
24Table 4.2: Predicted markups
Median value of VL c,k
Age group Predicted markup Std. error
Young ﬁrms 0.0227 0.0008
Middle aged ﬁrms 0.0386 0.0015
Old ﬁrms 0.0344 0.0011
95 pct. fractile of VL c,k
Age group Predicted markup Std. error
Young ﬁrms 0.0040 0.0017
Middle aged ﬁrms 0.0411 0.0019
Old ﬁrms 0.0459 0.0026
The predicted markups and their standard errors are reported
as ratios. Young ﬁrms are ﬁrms 10 years or younger. Old ﬁrms
are ﬁrms older than 20 years.
0.0386 
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Figure 4.3:
A ss h o w ni nT a b l e4 . 2 ,f o raﬁrm with a median value of our opaqueness measure
VL c,k, the predicted markup is more than two standard errors lower for an old ﬁrm
than for a middle aged ﬁrm. However, for a ﬁrm with a value of VL c,k corresponding
to the 95 pct. fractile, the markup for an old ﬁrm is a little less than two standard
errors higher than the markup for the middle aged ﬁrm. Hence, we have a 5 pct.
signiﬁcant fall in the markup for ﬁrms with median opaqueness going from middle
to old age, and a 10 pct. signiﬁcant increase in the markup for the ﬁrms with an
opaqueness at the 95 pct. fractile going from middle to old age. See the illustrations
in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Thus, the lock-in period for very opaque ﬁrm lasts on, as
opposed to less opaque ﬁrms where the markup reaches a maximum when ﬁrms are
in the middle age. These results support our Hypothesis IV; more opaque ﬁrms
have a longer lock-in period. However, with the setup of our model we are only
able to detect empirically a longer lock-in period for ﬁrms with severe asymmetric
information problems.
26Since 63 per cent of our observations relate to young ﬁrms (ﬁrms 10 years old
and younger), it could be argued that the volatility measure that proxies for the
importance of soft information and potential for lock-in, may be dominated by higher
bankruptcy volatility among the young ﬁrms. In order to check the robustness of
our results with respect to this, we replaced VL c,k with a similar measure but now
calculated only from ﬁrms older than 10 years, i.e., middle-aged and old ﬁrms. We
rerun the model (3.3). The qualitative results remained the same as shown in this
section, with just one exception.24 See Appendix B.
5. Concluding remarks
We develop a theoretical model explaining the life cycle pattern of bank-borrower
relationships. Our model predicts that, in order to attract new borrowers, banks
oﬀer loans with low or even negative interest rate markups to young ﬁrms. The
inside bank — the bank at which a borrower initially has borrowed — obtains an
information advantage which later on leads to lock-in eﬀects and positive interest
markups. As ﬁrms mature further they become more attractive borrowers for outside
banks. That induces outside banks to make their own credit assessments in order to
make competing loan oﬀers. This additional monitoring results in a more dispersed
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information and lower lock-in eﬀects and, consequently, lower interest
rate markups. Our theoretical model predicts that a stronger information advantage
of the inside bank leads to a more pronounced life-cycle of interest rate markups
and longer lock-in period. Using a large sample of Norwegian small ﬁrms and a
novel measure of asymmetric information related to lending to each ﬁrm, we ﬁnd
empirical support for these hypotheses.
A large share of the existing literature has used market concentration in the
loan market to explain interest rate markups. Our approach allows us to distin-
guish market-concentration eﬀects from informational lock-in eﬀects. In contrast to
Petersen and Rajan (1995) which focus on market concentration variables, we ﬁnd
that our asymmetric information variables better explain the interest rate markup
24The exception is VL c,k which is no longer statistically signiﬁcant, although it is still positive.
As alluded to in Appendix B, this may reﬂect the fact that the age at which ﬁrms become locked-
in will vary between industries or even between ﬁrms, and thus will be diﬃcult to determine
accurately.
27charged to young ﬁrms. We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect of market concentration
on interest rate markups as predicted by Petersen and Rajan. Our study illustrates
that banks market power is more closely related to the banks’ information advantage
—a nA k e r l o fe ﬀect, than to its market share — a Herﬁndahl eﬀect.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that stronger lock-in eﬀects make banks more willing to lend
to young high-risk ﬁrms. Thus, lock-in may contribute to the availability of bank
credit to such ﬁrms.25 This may have implications concerning ﬁnancial stability. In
a recession we would expect to see that banks experience more loan losses in market
segments with signiﬁcant lock-in eﬀects than in other market segments.
The model we introduced contributes to the further understanding of the in-
teraction and relationships established between banks and their borrowers. The
speciﬁc methods by which a bank obtains soft information about a borrower during
a relationship remains, however, to be further explored.
25See Petersen and Rajan (1995) which in their empirical analysis examine how credit availability
is associated with market concentration in the credit market.
28Appendix
A. The bankruptcy probability model SEBRA
This appendix contains a brief description of the bankruptcy prediction model
SEBRA. More detailed presentations are given in Eklund, Larsen, and Bernhardsen
(2001) and in Bernhardsen (2001).
The SEBRA model is estimated based on individual limited liability ﬁrm ac-
counting data. The model predicts the probability that a ﬁrm has its last year with
a submitted account and within the next three years the ﬁrm is registered as bank-
rupt. All RHS variables, which are either ﬁrm or industry speciﬁc, are collected from
the Register for Business Enterprises26 where all Norwegian limited liability ﬁrms
have to ﬁle their annual income and balance statements.27 The data used to esti-
mate SEBRA covers the years 1990 — 1996. Firms with total assets less than NOK
200,000 (≈ 25,000 euros) are excluded. The total data set used consists of about
400,000 ﬁrm observations. The estimated model is a logit model in the predicted
bankruptcy probability b p with the following RHS variables xi:
• Earnings
— earnings in per cent of total assets (tkr)
• Liquidity
— liquid assets less short-term debt in per cent of operating revenues (lik)
— unpaid indirect taxes in per cent of total assets (ube)
— trade accounts payable in per cent of total assets (lev)
• Financial strength
— equity in per cent of total assets (eka)
— dummy for the event of book equity less than paid-in capital (taptek)
26Foretaksregisteret i Brønnøysund
27Electronic versions of these acoounts have been supplied by Dun & Bradstreet.
29— dummy for dividend payments the last accounting year (div)
• Industry variables
— industry average for eka (meaneka)
— industry average for lev (meanlev)
— industry standard deviation for tkr (stdtkr)
• Age
— dummy variable for each of the ﬁrst 8 years of the ﬁrm’s age
• Size
— total assets (size)




b y = b β0 + b β1T1(x1)+b β2T2(x2)+...+ b βkTk(xk) and
Ti(xi)=
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⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨







 if xi ∈ {eka,tkr,lik,lev,ube}
xi if xi / ∈ {eka,tkr,lik,lev,ube}
The values of the estimated coeﬃcients are reported in Eklund, Larsen, and
Bernhardsen (2001). As expected b p is decreasing in tkr, eka,a n dlik, and it is
increasing in lev and ube.F o r t h e ﬁrst 8 years of a ﬁrm’s life the model predicts
lower bankruptcy probability by each year, except going from the ﬁrst to the second
year. After 8 years age has by construction no eﬀect on the bankruptcy probability.
For the 5 non-linearly transformed variables the marginal eﬀect on b p is non-linear in
the sense that the absolute value of the marginal eﬀect has a peak around a certain
value of xi.
30Syversten (2004) compares the predictive power of the SEBRA model with that
of Moody’s KMV Private Firm model for Norway — hereafter referred to as KMV.28
He uses "power curves" and their corresponding "accuracy ratios" to compare the
bankruptcy predictions of SEBRA and the default probability predictions of KMV
to actual bankruptcies for the four years 1998 — 2001. Syversten concludes that
SEBRA’s accuracy is as good as or somewhat better than the accuracy of KMV.
28As KMV for Norway only covers about 3,500 ﬁrms and the SEBRA model covers more than
100,000 ﬁrms the comparison is based on a relatively small sample of the ﬁrms in the SEBRA
model.
31Table B.1: Results, dependent variable mi,t, alterantive measure of VL c,k
Independent variable Coeﬃcient Robust t-values
β0 0.04319 10.45∗∗
dYO UNG ;i,t −0.01611 −5.73∗∗
dOLD;i,t −0.01282 −3.13∗∗
VLc,k 0.01591 0.62
VLc,k · dYO UNG ;i,t −0.2543 −6.18∗∗
VLc,k · dOLD;i,t 0.1817 2.61∗∗
HIc,t −3.39 · 10−6 −1.62
HIc,t · dYO UNG ;i,t 2.67 · 10−6 1.60
HIc,t · dOLD;i,t 3.60 · 10−6 1.66
F-test for HIc,t terms 1.12
#c l u s t e r s 36
#o b s e r v a t i o n s 54886
R2adj. 0.0246
The t-values reported are White-robust and adjusted for cluster-
ing of HIc,t. ∗ r e p r e s e n t sa1 0p c t .s t a t i s t i c a ls i g n i ﬁcance and ∗∗
5p c t .s i g n i ﬁcance
B. Applying a diﬀerent volatility measure
To check whether our results related to the estimation of (3.3) are driven by poten-
tially higher volatility of the bankruptcy probability among young ﬁrms, we rerun
(3.3) using a volatility measure excluding young ﬁrms. I.e., when calculating VL c,k
we now only include ﬁrms 11 years old or older. Estimation results using this alter-
native volatility measure are shown in Table B.1.
As can be seen these results are qualitatively the same as those reported in Table
4.1, except that the coeﬃcient of VL c,k, although positive, is no longer statistically
signiﬁcant. The economic interpretation of this latter result is that increased volatil-
ity does no longer increase the lock-in eﬀect of the middle-aged ﬁrms. However, this
m a ys i m p l yr e ﬂe c tt h ef a c tt h a tt h ea g ea tw h i c hﬁrms no longer are young, in
the sense of becoming locked-in by their lenders will vary between industries or
even between ﬁrms. Thus this age may be diﬃcult to determine accurately from a
32heterogeneous sample.29
The tests carried out for Hypothesis IV give the same qualitative results when
using the alternative volatility measure as those reported in Table 4.2.
29The robustness check performed in this appendix was also conducted deﬁning young ﬁrms as
those 12 years and younger. In that case the qualitative results were the same, but this time both
the coeﬃcient for VL c,k and the coeﬃcient for VL c,k · dOLD;i,t were statistically signiﬁcant at the
10 per cent level.
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